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Abstract 
A key factor of semi-presidential regimes is power-sharing mechanisms between president and 
government. Influenced by Shugart and Carey’s seminal work on premier-presidential regimes, this 
article addresses intra-executive dynamics in light of recent scholarship on the risks and 
consequences associated with conflict and cooperation between the president and the cabinet. 
Through an in-depth comparison of three premier-presidential systems with broadly similar 
constitutional designs, Finland, Lithuania, and Romania, it forces us to reconsider how coordination 
mechanisms and political context shape presidential influence. Absent of a working constitutional 
division of labour and established modes of intra-executive coordination, presidents are more likely 
to use alternative channels of influence – such as the strategy of ‘going public’ or direct contacts 
with political parties, the legislature, or civil society stakeholders – and to intervene in questions 
falling under the competence of the government. Lack of institutionalized coordination also benefits 
the presidents as they hold the initiative regarding cooperation between the two executives. 
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Introduction 
Understanding variation in president-cabinet relations in semi-presidential and presidential regimes, 
and to what extent this variation matters, are at the core of contemporary research on constitutional 
regime types (Åberg and Sedelius, 2018). Matthew Shugart and John Carey’s (1992) seminal study 
paved the way for this literature by making careful distinctions – anchored in neo-Madisonian 
theory about institutional origin and survival – between parliamentary, premier-presidential, 
president-parliamentary, and presidential regimes. Especially for semi-presidential regimes where a 
directly-elected president shares executive power with a prime minister (PM), president-cabinet 
relations are a very delicate matter indeed and ‘a primary challenge of constitutional design must be 
to establish a clear division between the authorities of head of state and head of government’ 
(Shugart and Carey, 1992: 56). 
Largely influenced by the work of Shugart and Carey, a number of studies have established that 
conflict between the two executives is to be expected under semi-presidentialism – both in premier-
presidential regimes (where the cabinet can only be dismissed by the parliament) and president-
parliamentary regimes (where both the president and the parliament have the formal power to 
dismiss the cabinet) (e.g., Elgie, 2018; Protsyk, 2005; 2006; Beuman, 2016). Intra-executive 
conflict is associated with negative outcomes such as cabinet instability (Sedelius and Ekman, 
2010) and disruptive policy-making (Lazardeux, 2015; 2017). A largely neglected variable in the 
comparative literature, however, is the institutional instruments for coordinating policy and 
executive leadership between the president and the cabinet. Shugart and Carey (1992: 59) indeed 
acknowledged the risks associated with constitutional ambiguities where presidents ‘may attempt to 
avoid conceding leadership of the executive by exercising extraordinary legislative authorities.’ Yet 
we still know very little about the extent to which coordination mechanisms between the two 
executives vary among semi-presidential countries, and more importantly, how such variation may 
influence the balance of power between the two chief executives. To be clear, we do not expect 
coordination mechanisms to be more important than key institutional variables, such as presidential 
powers or electoral and party system dynamics. But we do argue that typical president/cabinet 
conflicts over policy, legislation and appointments may in fact be manifestations of coordination 
problems. 
Apart from facilitating beneficial outcomes, effective coordination mechanisms reduce uncertainty 
and “can provide a salient point of reference for politicians who acknowledge the rules of the game” 
(Shugart and Carey, 1992: 61). Institutions can thus make a difference in that they induce actors 
otherwise driven by self-interest towards a ‘problem-solving’ mode characterized by cooperation 
and search for mutually beneficial solutions (e.g., Scharpf, 1989; North, 1990). And in line with the 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989; 2006), stable and repeated coordination should 
also over time strengthen the socialization effects of institutions whereby both executives, their 
offices, and other stakeholders become accustomed to certain ‘ways of doing things’ and perceive 
regular coordination as the appropriate course of action. 
Against the backdrop of existing data on presidential powers and levels of intra-executive conflict, 
and drawing on unique interview data in three premier-presidential countries – Finland, Lithuania 
and Romania – this article examines institutional instruments used for coordinating relations 
between the president and the cabinet. We have chosen to compare three premier-presidential 
countries, as this enables us to explore how the presence or absence of such instruments are related 
to the power balance and level of conflict inside the core executive. While the three countries have 
rather similar constitutional designs, they at the same time represent variation regarding presidential 
powers, level of intra-executive conflict, and political context. Finland is a stable democracy with a 
highly institutionalized political system, where a constitutional reform implemented in the 1990s 
resulted in a significant weakening of its historically strong presidency. Lithuania, on the contrary, 
is a young democracy with a largely personalized political culture but has generally functioned with 
few instances of severe intra-executive conflict. Romania, finally, has faced more severe 
transitional difficulties and has struggled with disruptive policy-making, widespread corruption and 
several instances of intense conflict between the president and the government. As explained in the 
third section of this article, the constitutional powers of the president are somewhat stronger in 
Lithuania and Romania than in Finland.  
Whilst acknowledging the importance of key variables such as presidential powers, party politics or 
political culture, this study will dig deeper into institutional design at the level of practices, routines 
and coordination instruments between the executives, that is, at a level where comparative research 
is currently lacking on systematic and empirical knowledge. By utilizing interview data with key 
civil servants and politicians, and official documents, we are able to reach ‘behind the scenes’ to 
explore the relative importance of coordination mechanisms vis-à-vis other more frequently 
addressed variables. Moreover, these unique data enable us to understand the interplay between 
institutional design at the operational level with the basic constitutional rules of premier-presidential 
regimes.  
In the next part, we set the theoretical framework of our study by addressing the incentives and 
disincentives for conflict and cooperation in premier-presidential regimes. We then identify various 
coordination instruments relevant to the interaction between the president and the PM. The 
subsequent sections present our data and a condensed contextualization of the Finnish, Lithuanian 
and Romanian regimes from the 1990s to the 2010s. The empirical analysis is structured around the 
presence or absence of coordination mechanisms identified in the theoretical section. Our main 
argument is that absent of a working constitutional division of labour and established modes of 
intra-executive coordination, presidents are more likely to use alternative channels of influence – 
such as the strategy of ‘going public’ or direct contacts with political parties, the legislature, or civil 
society stakeholders – and to intervene in questions falling under the competence of the 
government. Lack of regular, formal coordination mechanisms thus produces higher levels of 
presidential activism. Lack of institutionalized coordination will also benefit the presidents as they 
hold the initiative regarding cooperation between the two executives. In the conclusion, we sum up 
our main findings and discuss the general implications of our study for the wider literature on 
regime types and semi-presidential systems – also in light of Shugart and Carey’s seminal work. 
Theoretical framework: (dis)incentives for cooperation and coordination 
Conflict and cooperation in premier-presidential regimes 
Semi-presidential regimes encompass vast differences on the precise relationship between the 
cabinet and the president. Instead of splitting semi-presidentialism into a myriad of sub-categories, 
Shugart and Carey (1992) provided an operative categorization of semi-presidential regimes by 
distinguishing between premier-presidential regimes and president-parliamentary regimes. 
In this study, we focus only on premier-presidential regimes. However, also within that category we 
find considerable variation regarding presidential powers. Finland’s 2000 constitution, for example, 
provides the president with formal prerogatives, particularly through co-leadership of foreign 
policy, that are just a little more than those of a ceremonial figurehead. Other examples from 
Europe include Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia. A potential risk is that weak and marginalized, yet 
directly-elected, presidents can seek to compensate their limited powers with obtrusive behaviour, 
especially given that presidents are typically more popular than prime ministers. The presidents’ 
greater popularity may be attributed to their limited powers. They have projected themselves to be 
above party politics, being somewhat elevated from the usual political quarrels. Prime ministers, on 
the contrary, exercise their power in areas of controversy, such as social and economic policies, 
thereby further eroding their popular support. The paradox, however, is that presidents may feel that 
their popularity does not translate into political influence. When seeking ways of converting their 
perceived prestige into actual power, they may publicly criticize the government by leaning on the 
popular mandate. The literature is full of examples of such behaviour (Sedelius, 2006). 
When the government is clearly dominant, also the PM can feel no need for coordination beyond 
perhaps the president’s office receiving information about governmental decisions and policies. In 
general, the president and the PM should thus have stronger incentives for cooperation where there 
is a more balanced distribution of power between the government and the president and if the two 
executives share powers in particular policy areas. Under such power-sharing there are simply more 
issues subject to joint decision-making. To be sure, there are simultaneously also more possibilities 
for disagreement and conflict, which raise the need for regular and well-defined coordination in 
order to facilitate successful policy-making. Indeed, there may be good reasons for politicians 
motivated by re-election or policy influence not to enter into cooperation or, despite coordination 
mechanisms, to ‘go public’ with their opinion differences, especially when the two leaders represent 
different ideological blocs (cohabitation). For example, Lazardeux (2015) shows that in France, a 
regime characterized by active intra-executive coordination, particularly winning presidential 
elections, the main prize in French politics, have shaped the strategies of both executives. 
Regardless of the exact powers of presidents, presidential activism tends to be higher when the 
country is experiencing political turbulence, with low level of societal consensus or weak 
governments (e.g., Tavits, 2009). These considerations are particularly relevant for the younger 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, where surveys show high levels of public trust in the 
presidents but outright distrust in other political actors such as the PM and the parties. Apart from 
societal context and party system factors, we also expect to find variation between issue areas. 
Coordination is expected to be most advanced in foreign and security policies, including European 
Union (EU) affairs, issue areas where it is often emphasized that disunity at home should not 
undermine success abroad (Raunio and Wagner, 2017). 
Coordination mechanisms 
Figure 1 summarizes our basic theoretical argument. We understand cooperation mechanisms as 
intervening variables positioned between key explanatory factors derived from previous literature 
(constitutional powers, party politics, societal context) and the level of presidential activism and 
distribution of power inside the executive. This in turn is expected to affect the level of 
president/cabinet conflict and overall leadership capacity. The more regular and institutionalized the 
coordination mechanisms are, the stronger their effect should be. 
FIGURE 1 
We argue that coordinative institutions can make a genuine difference: individual office-holders are 
constrained by them, especially when the mechanisms have become more entrenched and 
recognized as legitimate by the actors involved. In contrast, when coordination instruments do not 
exist or are weak, then both executives have more freedom of manoeuvre. Without regular 
coordination, particularly the presidents are more likely to use alternative channels of influence – 
such as the strategy of ‘going public’ or direct contacts with political parties, the legislature, or civil 
society stakeholders – and to intervene in questions falling under the competence of the 
government. Furthermore, ad hoc practices are likely to favour the side that enjoys agenda-setting 
powers and can thus choose or at least strongly influence the levels and forms of coordination. 
 We need, finally, to outline how we define coordination instruments. We focus on three levels of 
coordination – bilateral (between the president the PM), collective (between the president and the 
government), and administrative (between the offices of the president and the prime minister and 
the ministries) – whilst also differentiating among policy areas. We introduce the coordination 
instruments one-by-one, identifying also their predicted roles in intra-executive coordination 
(Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2 
Bilateral meetings between the president and prime minister. 
We assign particular importance to confidential exchanges between the two leaders that form the 
core of intra-executive coordination. Hence this type of coordination is in the centre of Figure 2, 
whereas the other mechanisms should on average be less crucial particularly in terms of solving 
intra-executive conflicts. Regular talks between the president and the PM enable them to learn 
about each other’s preferences, negotiation styles, and personalities. Such face-to-face contacts 
should ideally take place before the president meets the whole government or before either side 
meets foreign leaders or attends international or EU meetings. In this way, potentially sensitive 
issues can be discussed in private and even if no compromise is found, both leaders can agree on 
how to proceed with these matters. However, it is unlikely that laws would regulate such bilateral 
meetings and thus they can be particularly vulnerable to break down after the election of new 
office-holders. 
Ministerial committees or joint councils between the president and the government. 
As the literature on coalition governments shows, ministerial committees perform an important 
function in both cabinet decision-making and as a conflict-resolution mechanism (Müller and 
 Strøm, 2000; Strøm et al., 2008). These ministerial committees typically bring together a sub-set of 
ministers from all coalition parties and they deal with specific issue areas such as economic policy 
or European policy. The powers and composition of the ministerial committees are normally 
regulated by laws or even by constitutions, with more detailed rules found in the government’s rules 
of procedure. In policy areas where the president shares power with the government, mainly in 
foreign and security policy, such ministerial committees would enable both sides to keep track of 
developments and to exchange ideas before the formal decision-making stage. Various joint 
councils would on average have a more informal status. These councils would again bring together 
the president and ministers to discuss specific societal issues such as education or economy. They 
could also take the form of periodic meetings between the whole government and the president that 
would focus perhaps mainly on topical issues. 
National security, foreign policy, or EU affairs councils. 
External relations were identified as a policy area where directly-elected presidents not only have 
constitutional powers but where countries are expected to act with one voice. National security 
councils or equivalents often have a central role in defining and planning the countries’ security and 
military strategies. They can simultaneously facilitate intra-executive coordination, but who chairs 
such bodies can be a delicate question. Naturally, ministerial committees can also be established to 
examine foreign and security policy and indeed European matters. EU affairs pose particular 
challenges for coordination, especially as the development of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) means that national foreign and security policies – areas where presidents enjoy 
constitutional powers – are increasingly linked to European level policy processes (Raunio, 2012). 
Hence, whether the president is involved in or excluded from the national EU coordination system 
can have broader implications for leadership in foreign affairs. 
Administrative coordination between the offices of the prime minister and the president. 
Moving away from the explicitly ‘political’ coordination to the administrative level, we are 
interested in the interaction between the respective offices of the president and the PM. 
Comparative literature suggests that the role of top-level administrative elites has become more 
important over the decades. Political leaders have typically two categories of staff working for 
them: civil servants that work for the state and political staff that come and go with individual 
office-holders. The prime minister’s office oversees and coordinates activities in the ministries 
while handling central governmental communication. Particularly the political staff provides policy 
advice to the PM or the president, including in foreign and security policy, and can be key players 
in solving disputes between different branches of government. (E.g. Mitchell, 2005; Eichbaum and 
Shaw, 2014; Yong and Hazell, 2014; Gherghina and Kopecký, 2016; Marland et al., 2017) 
Regular coordination between the staffs of the PM and the president should facilitate successful 
cooperation between the two executives. However, the size and responsibilities of the president’s 
staff can also be important variables in shaping the role and influence of the president. Even when 
the president’s office is small, the presidents can compensate this with recruiting personnel that 
focus on specific policy areas, including those falling in the competence of the government. For 
example, a policy adviser in economy can provide crucial information to the president and can form 
contacts with the relevant ministry and parliamentary committee – thereby seeking to win support 
for the positions and initiatives of the president. Furthermore, an effective communication staff can 
be of substantial help in spreading the word about president’s views and activities. 
To sum up, the weaker the presence of such coordination mechanisms, the more there is space and 
need for presidential activism: direct contacts to individual ministers and party leaders, the 
parliament and its party groups, with the president building these contacts to ‘stay in the loop’ of 
 governmental activities and to influence decision-making in the cabinet or the legislature. 
Presidents are in most cases elected as candidates of a particular political party or coalition of 
parties, and hence ties to those parties should naturally be stronger than to the competing parties. 
Weaker coordination should also increase the likelihood of the president criticizing the cabinet 
publicly. 
Three cases of premier-presidentialism: Finland, Lithuania, and Romania 
As explained in the introductory section, our three cases represent different semi-presidential 
experiences: a stable political system and the considerable weakening of a historically strong 
presidency in Finland from the 1990s onwards; general intra-executive stability under a 
personalized political system in Lithuania; and stronger presidential influence, personalized politics, 
and high institutional tensions in Romania. The constitutional prerogatives of the president are 
stronger in Lithuania and Romania than in post-2000 Finland (Table 1), but in all three countries 
foreign policy is either led by the president (Lithuania and Romania) or co-directed between the 
president and the government (Finland). Lithuania and Romania share the legacy of systemic 
communism, the subsequent transition to democracy and market economy in the 1990s, and the EU 
and NATO accession processes in the 2000s. 
However, the selection of cases is also based on the fact that these countries embody various 
patterns of intra-executive dynamics and conflict. Table 1 reports the level of president/cabinet 
conflict as measured by Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013) and Elgie (2018). Both studies are based on 
expert surveys although Elgie covers a longer period and a larger set of countries, including 
Finland. Romania has clearly experienced more instances of intra-executive conflict than Finland 
and Lithuania. Already at the beginning of the transition period, there was intense conflict 
culminating in violent demonstrations between President Ion Iliescu and PM Petre Roman. 
Cohabitation in Romania has tended to generate conflict and has twice, 2007 and 2012, ended in 
impeachment procedures against the president. Although the president’s role in policy-making is 
restricted to foreign and security matters, Romanian presidents to date have exercised substantial 
influence over the whole political process. Presidential involvement is facilitated by Article 80(2) of 
the constitution, according to which “the President of Romania shall guard the observance of the 
Constitution and the proper functioning of the public authorities. To this effect, he shall act as a 
mediator between the Powers in the State, as well as between the State and society.” Reflecting the 
French model of semi-presidentialism, the idea is that president is above the parties and in that 
capacity responsible for the smooth functioning of the political system. 
As with other Central and East European contexts, scholars have characterized the political systems 
in Lithuania and Romania in terms of personalisation and relatively low levels of institutionalisation 
(Crowther and Suciu, 2013; Duvold and Jurkynas, 2013). A high percentage of citizens appear to 
favour the presidency over other institutions including the PM and political parties (Baltic 
Barometer, 2014; Ekman et al., 2016). Despite its formally weak powers, the presidency is 
considered in both countries as the big prize for ambitious political leaders, which enhances the 
importance of personalities. In this sense, there is a presidentialization component involved where 
political parties have often been organized around individuals with political ambitions related to 
personal interests and to the presidency (cf. Samuels and Shugart, 2010). 
TABLE 1 
Expert interviews and data 
Our data and analysis cover the period from early 1990s to 2018. We use official documents, 
secondary material such as politicians’ memoirs and research literature, and particularly interview 
data with top-level civil servants and politicians sitting on first-hand knowledge on the inside 
structures and processes of president-cabinet relations. The experts on each country were contacted 
in order to collect information on how the semi-presidential systems have worked in practice with 
regard to intra-executive relations and coordination mechanisms. Having charted the existence of 
coordination mechanisms, the key objective of the interviews was to establish the actual role and 
importance of these institutions. The topic is obviously quite sensitive and the interviewees were 
willing to speak only under the condition of anonymity. A total of 10 persons were interviewed in 
Finland, 9 in Lithuania, and 12 in Romania. Many of them had experience of intra-executive 
coordination under two or more presidents. The positions of the interviewees include current and 
former high-level civil servants, counsellors and advisors in the offices of the president and the PM, 
speakers and members of parliaments, and ministers including one former prime minister.1  
Empirical analysis 
Our comparison of coordination mechanisms reveals significant differences between the three 
countries (Table 2). Given space limitations, the analysis focuses purposefully on uncovering 
patterns of coordination and behaviour in Finland, Lithuania and Romania, with concrete examples 
of intra-executive conflict or presidential activism only used to illustrate or highlight particular 
country-specific developments.2   
TABLE 2 
In our theoretical framework, we assigned particular weight to bilateral, confidential exchanges 
between the two leaders. In Finland the system has remained the same ever since the new 
constitution entered into force in 2000. The president meets the PM essentially on a weekly basis, 
on Fridays before the plenary of the government and a potential meeting of the Ministerial 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. These bilateral meetings are very short, lasting 
normally at most half an hour. While not based in any law or decree, the meetings have become an 
established practice not dependent on individual office-holders. No prime minister or president has 
questioned their importance and legitimacy, and it is very likely that such action by either executive 
would be strongly criticized by the political and administrative elites and the media. 
In Lithuania and Romania, on the other hand, much depends on the party-political context and the 
presidents that have the initiative regarding such meetings. In Lithuania the presidents have by and 
large met prime ministers regularly, but presidents have also opted not to have such bilateral talks. 
For example, President Dalia Grybauskaitė met the PM almost weekly, but for six months in 2016 
there were no regular meetings with the PM. Also during the presidencies of Algirdas Brazauskas 
and Valdas Adamkus the regularity of meetings varied. Overall, out of our three countries the 
importance of party politics and especially cohabitation is definitely strongest in Romania, and this 
is also displayed in bilateral exchanges. Such interaction is certainly smoother and more active 
when the president and the PM share the same political affiliation (for example between Nicolae 
Văcăroiu and Ion Iliescu, Victor Ciorbea and Emil Constantinescu, and Emil Boc and Traian 
Băsescu). In such circumstances bilateral talks can take place weekly or even more often, and 
should be understood in the overall context of the president being actively involved in the work of 
his party. When the president and the PM come from opposing ideological camps, cooperation is 
less regular and has been in several instances clearly hampered by tensions between the two leaders. 
For example, in spring 2018 cooperation between President Klaus Iohannis and PM Viorica Dăncilă 
was difficult, with Iohannis accusing the prime minister of avoiding contacts. 
None of the countries employ more permanent joint councils that would bring together the president 
and members of the government. Finland is the only country utilizing ministerial committees, with 
the president chairing the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. Meeting regularly, 
it performs an important function in the co-leadership of foreign and security policy between the 
president and the cabinet. In Lithuania presidents Brazauskas and Adamkus made use of some more 
short-term councils, and obviously presidents from all three countries have at different time points 
set up various working groups or brought together relevant stakeholders to discuss a range of topics. 
In the realm of security and defence policy the situation is very different, with each country having 
decision-making bodies that bring together the president and the government. In all three countries 
the president and the foreign minister also maintain regular contacts. As discussed above, in Finland 
the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy can be considered to perform a 
coordinating role in security policy, as the committee deals with all issues related to Finland’s 
foreign and security policy, defence matters included. In Lithuania the functions and competence of 
the State Defence Council are defined in the constitution and the Special Law on State Defence 
Council. Romania also has a similar special coordinating authority, the Supreme Council of 
National Defence (CSAT). Furthermore, in line with Article 87 of the constitution, the Romanian 
president can chair those sessions of the full government where national security issues are on the 
agenda. Notably, the president needs to be invited to such meetings, and hence the frequency of the 
presidential sessions of the government depends not only on external developments but also on 
relations between the PM and the president. It is important to note that in all three countries it is the 
president who chairs the security councils. This clearly strengthens the position of the president 
both regarding when meetings are held and actual decision-making in the sessions. 
Finally, turning to administrative coordination, there is less variation between our three cases. This 
is of course logical when considering that in all three countries the two executives essentially need 
to exchange information in order to facilitate decision-making in matters where both the president 
 and the PM are involved, such as appointments. Given that in all three cases the president either 
leads foreign and security policy or at least co-directs it with the government, it is not surprising 
that such administrative coordination is most developed in external relations. Presidential offices 
are also in very active contact with the foreign ministry, as in all three countries the foreign ministry 
is mainly responsible for handling day-to-day administration regarding foreign policy: 
communication with other countries and international organisations, preparing national positions, 
particularly those to be presented in the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU, and planning state visits 
abroad. 
The analysis so far shows that Finland has considerably more intra-executive coordination 
mechanisms, particularly through bilateral exchanges between the two leaders and through the 
Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. Lithuania and Romania have less such 
institutionalized cooperation instruments, and hence we should thus expect higher levels of 
presidential activism in these two countries. In Finland, the deliberate and consensual process of 
constitutional reform in the 1990s continues to shape the role of the president. Under the old 
constitution, and notably during the long reign of President Urho Kekkonen (1956-1981), it was 
customary for the president to intervene in domestic matters. Against the backdrop of such 
presidential activism, a broad understanding emerged around the need to constrain the presidency so 
that the government and the Eduskunta would be responsible for domestic and EU affairs while 
presidential influence would be limited to the field of foreign and security policy. The public seems 
to favour a stronger presidency, but by and large it is not considered appropriate for the Finnish 
president to become involved in matters falling under the jurisdiction of the government. This 
applies particularly to government formation, as one of the key factors contributing to the position 
of Kekkonen was his ability to basically dominate government formation processes, cherry-picking 
prime ministers and vetoing ministerial candidates and even the inclusion of whole parties in 
 cabinets. In the 21st century it is expected that the president does not intervene in any way in 
cabinet formation, although the president is consulted about the choice of the foreign minister. 
Presidents normally do not comment on on-going government formation talks beyond perhaps 
expressing the hope that the talks are not delayed too much. Nor do Finnish presidents really 
publicly criticize the government. For example, when the social democratic President Tarja Halonen 
shared power with centre-right prime ministers from 2003 to 2012, she often emphasized different 
topics in her speeches, but even in case of open clashes, such as over civil service appointments or 
representation in the European Council, she mainly refrained from publicly attacking the 
government. The exceptions are issues falling under the foreign policy co-leadership between the 
president and the government, where Halonen and particularly President Sauli Niinistö have on rare 
occasions publicly questioned the comments made by cabinet ministers. 
In Lithuania and Romania, on the other hand, it is certainly both legitimate and appropriate for the 
president to both ‘go public’ and to interfere in matters that constitutionally belong to the 
competence of the government. Government formation is crucial here, as each Lithuanian and 
Romanian president has tried to influence the selection of premiers and other cabinet members, 
while also using public pressure to force PMs to resign. In both countries presidents routinely attack 
the PM and the government in their public speeches and interviews, including even in official 
addresses delivered in the parliament. Here the presidents, as guardians of national interest above 
the dirty deals and shady bargaining of party politics, benefit from the low trust in parties and 
political institutions. For example, in Lithuania President Adamkus resorted twice to high-profile 
television speeches when forcing prime ministers Gediminas Vagnorius (1999) and Brazauskas 
(2006) to resign from office. President Grybauskaitė in turn has essentially in all her State of the 
Nation addresses criticized the government or the Lithuanian political system at large. 
 In Romania presidential activism has been facilitated by the above-mentioned constitutional clause, 
according to which the president ‘mediates’ between state institutions. Our analysis and earlier 
literature on Romanian politics clearly show the challenges caused by this constitutional clause. In 
the impeachment cases against Băsescu the president was accused of misusing his ‘mediating’ role. 
His political opponents argued that Băsescu had maintained too close ties to his own party and had 
unnecessarily interfered in the work of the government and the legislature. (Ghergina and Miscoiu, 
2013; Perju, 2015) In both countries cohabitation reduces presidential influence and makes it 
substantially more challenging for the president to use informal party channels, but at the same time 
it contributes to the presidents making active use of other avenues such as public speeches. 
Presidents are also more likely to resort to direct contacts with political parties, the state 
administration, and civil society actors when they do not have friendly majorities in the parliament. 
The best example comes from the turbulent presidency of Băsescu. When relations with Prime 
Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu soured, the president did not hesitate to repeatedly attack the 
premier and his cabinet in public. According to the comparative study of Elgie (2018: 127-149) this 
cohabitation produced one of the highest levels of intra-executive conflict across the examined 21 
European countries. However, during the premiership of Emil Boc from 2008 to 2011 Băsescu’s 
position was indeed very strong and this period probably was the peak in the ‘presidentialization’ of 
Romanian politics so far. But when forced to share power with Prime Minister Victor Ponta from 
2012 onwards, Băsescu had little choice but to accept a more limited role during the final two years 
of his presidency. 
At the same time it is important to go beyond cohabitation when assessing the role of political 
parties in facilitating or hindering presidential influence. In all three countries the president as the 
head of state is not formally a member of any party, but here we see notable variation. Romanian 
presidents, notably Iliescu and Băsescu, have been quite openly involved in the work of their 
parties: the presidents have attended various party congresses, maintained in general close ties with 
their parties, and even campaigned in favour of their parties in parliamentary elections. In Lithuania 
such party ties are much weaker, although we must remember that two of the three presidents, 
Adamkus and Grybauskaitė were elected into office as independent candidates. In Finland the non-
involvement of presidents in party politics is strictly observed. The Lithuanian and Romanian 
examples also illustrate how ‘outsider’ presidents, such as Constantinescu and Iohannis, have found 
it much more difficult to shape politics than incumbents that have long experience from party 
politics. 
The policy ambitions of the president are clearly reflected in the size and functions of the respective 
presidential offices. The Finnish president has a very small office and it is clear that the president is 
strongly dependent on preparatory work carried out by the government. In Lithuania and Romania, 
in turn, the presidential staff has performed a key role in facilitating presidential activism and also 
policy influence. The staff of each Lithuanian president has comprised also or even mainly policy 
advisers in areas falling under the competence of the government – including social policy, 
economic policy, education, culture, religion etc. In late 2018 the office of President  Grybauskaitė 
brought together 50 persons under the following organizational headings: Economic and Social 
Policy Group (8 advisors), National Security Group (4), Press Service (11), Education, Science and 
Culture Group (5), Legal Affairs Group (5), Domestic Policy Group (2), Foreign Policy Group (10, 
four of whom work for the Protocol Division), and the Office of the Chancellor (5). In Romania the 
advisors to the president cover essentially all policy sectors. Apart from the President’s Cabinet and 
the General Secretariat, in late 2018 the presidential administration was divided into the following 
departments: National Security; Foreign Policy; European Affairs; Legislative Affairs; Relations 
with Public Authorities and Civil Society; Domestic Politics; Institutional and Constitutional 
Reform; Economic and Social Policies; Culture, Religion and Centenary; Public Health; Education 
and Research; Relation with Romanians Abroad; Public Communication; and Protocol. Each 
department is headed by a presidential advisor and has roughly three to five employees that 
essentially come and go with each president. Altogether around 200 persons work for the president. 
With the help of these advisors, successive Lithuanian and Romanian presidents have actively 
formed ties with individual ministers and ministries, political parties, the MPs, and civil society 
stakeholders. 
The obvious challenge stemming from lack of clear constitutional rules and a shared understanding 
of the respective duties of the president and the government is that power can be very much ‘up for 
grabs’. This applies particularly to periods when the government is weak or effectively under the 
control of the president. The best example comes from EU affairs. In all three countries the 
government and specifically the PM is in charge of national European policy, and yet representation 
in the European Council has produced major political drama and jurisdictional disputes. Following 
the Lisbon Treaty (2009) each country is represented in the European Council either by the PM or 
the president, and in Finland, despite objections from President Halonen who had participated in the 
majority of the European Council meetings together with the prime minister, it was decided by the 
government that the PM would be representing Finland. According to a constitutional amendment 
from 2012 ‘The Prime Minister represents Finland on the European Council. Unless the 
Government exceptionally decides otherwise, the Prime Minister also represents Finland in other 
activities of the European Union requiring the participation of the highest level of State.’ The 
situation is thus very clear, with the government representing Finland in all EU meetings, including, 
for example, also more informal summits between the EU and countries or regions outside the 
Union. (Raunio, 2012) 
The Lithuanian and Romanian constitutions are in turn silent about representation in the European 
Council, and in general do not say very much about how European matters are handled 
domestically. However, the constitutions of both countries do stipulate that foreign policy is led by 
the president, with the president thus being the main representative of the state in external relations. 
In Lithuania President Adamkus attended certain European Council meetings, including together 
with the PM. Grybauskaitė in turn has monopolized representation in the summits, and this practice 
has not been seriously questioned, not even by Seimas. Grybauskaitė essentially benefitted from the 
weakness of the cabinet of Andrius Kubilius which needed presidential support for its austerity 
measures. In Romania it is also the president that attends the European Council. A major conflict 
between PM Ponta and President Băsescu broke out in 2012 about the issue. Ponta, backed by the 
legislature, claimed the mandate to represent the country in the European Council of 28-29 June. 
The president refused to accept this and the Constitutional Court ruled in Băsescu’s favour, stating 
that as the president represents the country in foreign affairs, the PM could attend the European 
Council only on the basis of an express mandate from the president (Perju, 2015). Lithuanian and 
Romanian presidents have also influenced other EU issues and have specific staff focusing on 
European matters. 
The preceding analysis thus confirms that absent of written rules or otherwise strong norms guiding 
intra-executive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing their own modes of 
operation (Lithuania and Romania) – and vice versa (Finland). In line with institutional theory, the 
adopted approach has become the appropriate course of action, with each new Lithuanian and 
Romanian president bringing her own staff, personality and leadership style to the equation. When 
both countries adopted semi-presidential constitutions, it was for various reasons not perceived 
important or legitimate to detail the institutional forms for coordination between the executives. The 
Lithuanian and Romanian presidents also enjoy the power of initiative regarding cooperation, and 
this can of course facilitate presidential influence. For example, while regular joint meetings might 
facilitate better coordination, presidents do not need necessarily such bodies. As one interviewee 
from Lithuania put it: ‘Presidents that have enough powers do not create such councils, they do not 
need such kind of institutions, they just arrange ad hoc meetings despite the fact that it is not 
foreseen in any law.’ Coordination is clearly most institutionalized in foreign and security policy, 
including between foreign ministries and the president’s office. Lithuania and Romania utilize 
specific national security councils whereas Finland has a ministerial committee on security policy. 
Such bodies facilitate confidential exchange of information between the two executives, and our 
interviews in general confirm that even when the president and the PM disagree about domestic 
matters, particular attention is paid to ensuring that the countries speak with one voice in 
international negotiations. 
Conclusions 
Shugart and Carey (1992) paved the way for more institutionally informed and structured 
examinations of intra-executive dynamics in semi-presidential regimes. By developing their 
typology of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems anchored in the separation of 
powers principle, they provided a clear-cut framework for approaching incentives and disincentives 
that structure president/cabinet relations. Against the backdrop of their seminal work, this study has 
focused on coordination instruments between the president and government in premier-presidential 
regimes, an institutional factor that has been largely ignored by previous literature. Our results may 
not be altogether surprising but they are logical: the more institutionalized and regular cooperation 
between the two executives is, the less we find presidential activism and intra-executive conflict. 
The absence of coordination in turn produces more tensions and opens the door for presidential 
activism, not least through public criticism of the cabinet and direct contacts with political parties, 
the state administration, the legislature, and civil society actors. 
At the same time, we must exercise caution when drawing lessons from our study. Given the lack of 
previous research on both intra-executive coordination mechanisms and on presidential activism, 
this article should thus in many ways be understood as an exploratory exercise. We have compared 
one stable democracy (Finland) with two younger, less institutionalized political regimes (Lithuania 
and Romania). Hence our main findings need to be understood in the context of these rather 
fundamental societal differences. In terms of causal mechanisms, we also readily acknowledge that 
there are many variables at play and how much coordination mechanisms account for the observed 
differences and similarities between the three countries is very difficult to establish. As a result, we 
should be careful before inferring any causal interpretations from our analysis. For example, the 
transition to democracy and the broader modernization of the society have proven difficult in 
Romania, with poor constitutional design contributing to the high level of presidential activism and 
intra-executive conflict (Ghergina, 2015; Elgie, 2018: 215-249). Yet, we must ask whether the 
presence of regular coordination mechanisms could have prevented the impeachments or the overall 
assertive presidential behaviour. Similarly, we can reflect on how much the relatively smooth intra-
executive relations in Finland result from the president meeting both the PM and the whole 
government almost every week. 
Our article also highlights the interplay between institutional mechanisms, political culture, and 
party politics. The semi-presidential regimes in Central and Eastern Europe are in general 
characterized by personality-centred political cultures coupled with low trust in parties and political 
institutions. This facilitates presidential activism irrespective of the party-political context and 
makes it possible for individual presidents to shape the balance of power in their favour. Both 
Lithuania and Romania have opted not to establish regular intra-executive coordination mechanisms 
beyond foreign and security policy, and our study suggests the need to explore whether the lack of 
coordination instruments and the observed behavioural patterns apply also to other countries in the 
region. Institutionalized coordination mechanisms may make politics less entertaining by reducing 
public confrontations between the two executives, but they facilitate policy-making and coherent 
political leadership, outcomes that are clearly relevant for all semi-presidential countries. 
1 For reasons of space we do not list here the official documents or the interviewed persons. The 
official documents mainly consisted of the respective constitutions and relevant laws, as well as 
governments’ rules of procedure and other documents about intra-executive coordination. Full list 
of research material is available from the authors. 
2 Previous research offers detailed accounts of specific intra-executive conflicts. See particularly 
Gallagher and Andrievici (2008), Krupavičius (2008; 2013), Gherghina (2013), and Raunio and 
Sedelius (2017). 
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 Figure 1. Theoretical argument: coordination instruments and political outcomes. 
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Notes: a) Shugart and Carey’s pioneering measure of presidential power separates between six 
legislative powers (package veto, partial veto, decree, legislative initiative, budget powers, and 
referenda initiative) and four non-legislative powers (cabinet formation, cabinet dismissal, assembly 
censoring, and dissolution of assembly). Each power is scored from 0 to 4 with a total maximum 
power score of 40 altogether. b) Doyle and Elgie’s presidential power scores are based on 28 
existing measures in the literature. The scores are in the range from 0 to 1 in separate time periods 
following constitutional changes. They provide two sets of scores with some differences in 
statistical specifications behind them. Here we report scores only from their Prespower1 dataset. c) 
and d) Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013) and Elgie (2018) use expert surveys to estimate the level of 
president/cabinet conflict and they indicate high-level conflict as ‘the situation where there was 
persistent and severe conflict between the president and the cabinet’ (Elgie 2018: 130).  
Sources: Doyle and Elgie (2016); Elgie (2018); Shugart and Carey (1992); Sedelius and Mashtaler 
(2013). 
 Table 2. Intra-Executive Coordination Mechanisms in Finland, Lithuania and Romania. 
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